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Abstract
Background: Retaining doctors in rural areas is a challenge in Bangladesh. In this study, we analyzed three rural 
retention policies: career development programs, compulsory services, and schools outside major cities – in terms of 
context, contents, actors, and processes.
Methods: Series of group discussions between policy-makers and researchers prompted the selection of policy areas, 
which were analyzed using the policy triangle framework. We conducted document and literature reviews (1971-2013), 
key informant interviews (KIIs) with relevant policy elites (n = 11), and stakeholder analysis/position-mapping. 
Results: In policy-1, we found, applicants with relevant expertise were not leveraged in recruitment, promotions were 
often late and contingent on post-graduation. Career tracks were porous and unplanned: people without necessary 
expertise or experience were deployed to high positions by lateral migration from unrelated career tracks or ministries, 
as opposed to vertical promotion. Promotions were often politically motivated. In policy-2, females were not ensured to 
stay with their spouse in rural areas, health bureaucrats working at district and sub-district levels relaxed their monitoring 
for personal gain or political pressure. Impractical rural posts were allegedly created to graft money from applicants in 
exchange for recruitment assurance. Compulsory service was often waived for political affiliates. In policy-3, we found 
an absence of clear policy documents obligating establishment of medical colleges in rural areas. These were established 
based on political consideration (public sector) or profit motives (private sector).
Conclusion: Four cross-cutting themes were identified: lack of proper systems or policies, vested interest or corruption, 
undue political influence, and imbalanced power and position of some stakeholders. Based on findings, we recommend, 
in policy-1, applicants with relevant expertise to be recruited; recruitment should be quick, customized, and transparent; 
career tracks (General Health Service, Medical Teaching, Health Administration) must be clearly defined, distinct, and 
respected. In policy-2, facilities must be ensured prior to postings, female doctors should be prioritized to stay with the 
spouse, field bureaucrats should receive non-practising allowance in exchange of strict monitoring, and no political 
interference in compulsory service is assured. In policy-3, specific policy guidelines should be developed to establish 
rural medical colleges. Political commitment is a key to rural retention of doctors.
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Implications for policy makers
• The recruitment policy of the health cadre of Bangladesh Civil Service should be changed in such a way that leverages applicants with training 
in public health, health systems, health management, etc., in addition to the existing qualifications.  
• Recruitment and promotion of doctors should be timely, customized (ie, according to the specific need of the health cadre of Bangladesh Civil 
Service), and transparent.
• Career tracks (General Health Service, Medical Teaching, Health Administration) are found to be porous and unplanned; so, these need to be 
clearly defined, distinct from one another, and respected (ie, free from political motives or motives other than relevant expertise and experience).
• Health bureaucrats working at district and sub-district level reportedly relax their monitoring for personal gain or political pressure; so, they 
should receive non-practising allowance, so that they are encouraged for stricter and better monitoring.
• Since medical colleges are often established based on political consideration (public sector) or only profit motives (private sector), specific 
people-centered policy guidelines should be developed and implemented regarding establishing rural based medical colleges.
Implications for the public
This research unearths several loopholes contributing to the failures in retaining doctors in rural areas. These findings would empower the citizen to 
enhance their vigilance on the public-sector doctors and their managers, and hold them accountable for the services they are mandated to provide.
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Politics and Power in Global Health: The Constituting Role 
of Conflicts
Comme t on “Navigating Between St alth Advocacy and Unconscious Dogm tism: The 
Challenge of Researching the Norms, Politics and Power of Global Health”
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Abstract
In a recent article, Gorik Ooms has drawn attention to the normative underpinnings of the politics of 
global health. We claim that Ooms is indirectly submitting to a liberal conception of politics by framing 
the politics of global health as a question of individual morality. Drawing on the theoretical works of 
Chantal Mouffe, we introduce a conflictual concept of the political as an alternative to Ooms’ conception. 
Using controversies surrounding medical treatment of AIDS patients in developing countries as a case we 
underline the opportunity for political changes, through political articulation of an issue, and collective 
mobilization based on such an articulation.
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In a recent contribution to the ongoing debate about the role of power in global health, Gorik Ooms emphasizes the normative underpinnings of global health politics. 
He identifies three related problems: (1) a lack of agreement 
among global health scholars about their normative premises, 
(2) a lack of agreement between global health scholars and 
policy-makers regarding the normative premises underlying 
policy, and (3) a lack of willingness among scholars to 
clearly state their normative premises and assumptions. This 
confusion is for Ooms one of the explanations “why global 
health’s policy-makers are not implementing the knowledge 
generated by global health’s empirical scholars.” He calls 
for greater unity between scholars and between scholars 
and policy-makers, concerning the underlying normative 
premises and greater openness when it comes to advocacy.1
We commend the effort to reinstate power and politics in 
global health and agree that “a purely empirical evidence-based 
approach is a fiction,” and that such a view risks covering up 
“the role of politics and power.” But by contrasting this fiction 
with global health rese rch “drive  by crises, hot issues, and 
the concer s of organized interest groups,” as a “path we are 
trying to m v  aw y from,” Ooms is submitting to  liberal 
con p ion of politics he implicitly criticizes the outco es 
of.1 A liberal view of politics evades the constituting role of 
conflicts and reduces it to either a rationalistic, economic 
calculation, or an individual question of moral norms. This 
is echoed in Ooms when he states that “it is not possible to 
discuss the politics of global health without discussing the 
normative premises behind the politics.”1 But what if we 
take the political as the primary level and the normative as 
secondary, or derived from the political?
That is what we will try to do here, by introducing an 
alternative conceptualization of the political and hence free 
us from the “false dilemma” Ooms also wants to escape. 
“Although constructivists have emphasized how underlying 
normative structures constitute actors’ identities and 
interests, they have rarely treated these normative structures 
themselves as defined and infused by power, or emphasized 
how constitutive effects also are expressions of power.”2 This 
is the starting point for the political theorist Chantal Mouffe, 
and her response is to develop an ontological conception of 
the political, where “the political belongs to our ontological 
condition.”3 According to Mouffe, society is instituted 
through conflict. “[B]y ‘the political’ I mean the dimension of 
antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, 
while by ‘politics’ I mean the set of practices and institutions 
through which an order is created, organizing human 
coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the 
political.”3 An issue or a t pic needs to be ontested to become 
political, and such a contestation concerns public action and 
creates a ‘we’ and ‘the ’ form of collective identification. But 
the fixation of social rel tions is p rtia  and precarious, since 
antagonism is an ever present possibility. To politicize an issue 
and be able to mobilize support, one needs to represent the 
world in a conflictual manner “with opposed camps with 
which people can identify.”3 
Ooms uses the case of “increasing international aid spending 
on AIDS treatment” to illustrate his point.1 He frames the 
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 a rece t c tri ti  t  t e g i g e a  a t t e 
r le f er i  gl al ealt , rik s e asiz s 
t e r ative er i i gs f gl al ealt  litics. 
e i e tifies t ree relate  r le s: (1) a lack f agree e t 
a g gl al ealt  sc lars a t t eir r ative re ises, 
(2) a lack f agree e t et ee  gl al ealt  sc lars a  
licy- akers regar i g t e r ative re ises erlyi g 
licy, a  (3) a lack f illi g ess a g sc lars t  
clearly state t eir r ative re ises a  ass ti s. is 
c f si  is f r s e f t e ex la ati s “ y gl al 
ealt ’s licy- akers are t i le e ti g t e k le ge 
ge erate  y gl al ealt ’s e irical sc lars.” e calls 
f r greater ity et ee  sc lars a  et ee  sc lars 
a  licy- akers, c cer i g t e erlyi g r ative 
re ises a  greater e ess e  it c es t  a v cacy.1
e c e  t e eff rt t  rei state er a  litics i  
gl al ealt  a  agree t at “a rely e irical evi e ce- ase  
a r ac  is a ficti ,” a  t at s c  a vie  risks c veri g  
“t e r le f litics a  er.” t y c trasti g t is ficti  
it  gl al ealt  researc  “ riven y crises, t iss es, a  
t e c cerns f rga ize  i terest gr s,” as a “ at  e are 
tryi g t  ve a ay fr ,” s is s itti g t  a li eral 
c i  f litics e i licitly criticizes t e tc es 
f.1  li eral vie  f litics eva es t e c stit ti g r le f 
c flicts a  re ces it t  eit er a rati alistic, ec ic 
calc lati , r a  i ivi al esti  f ral r s. is 
is ec e  i  s e  e states t at “it is t ssi le t  
isc ss t e litics f gl al ealt  it t isc ssi g t e 
r ative re ises e i  t e litics.”1 t at if e 
take t e litical as t e ri ary level a  t e r ative as 
sec ary, r erive  fr  t e litical?
at is at e ill try t   ere, y i tr ci g a  
alter ative c ce t alizati  f t e litical a  e ce free 
s fr  t e “false ile a” s als  a ts t  esca e. 
“ lt g  c str ctivists ave e asize   erlyi g 
r ative str ct res c stit te act rs’ i e tities a  
i terests, t ey ave rarely treate  t ese r ative str ct res 
t e selves as efi e  a  i f se  y er, r e asize  
 c stit tive effects als  are ex ressi s f er.”2 is 
is t e starti g i t f r t e litical t e rist a tal ffe, 
a  er res se is t  evel  a  t l gical c ce ti  f 
t e litical, ere “t e litical el gs t  r t l gical 
c iti .”3 cc r i g t  ffe, s ciety is i stit te  
t r g  c flict. “[ ]y ‘t e litical’ I ea  t e i e si  f 
a tag is  ic  I take t  e c stit tive f a  s cieties, 
ile y ‘ litics’ I ea  t e set f ractices a  i stit ti s 
t r g  ic  a  r er is create , rga izi g a  
c existe ce i  t e c text f c flict ality r vi e  y t e 
litical.”3  iss e r a to ic ee s t  e c teste  t  ec e 
litical, a  s c  a c testati  c cer s lic acti  a  
creates a ‘ e’ a  ‘t ey’ f r  f c llective i e tificati . t 
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a  e a le t  ilize s rt, e ee s t  re rese t t e 
rl  i  a c flict al a er “ it  se  ca s it  
ic  e le ca  i e tify.”3 
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Background 
Despite global, regional and national efforts to improve the 
health of the general population, the significant challenges 
remain to meet the health needs of those living in low- and 
middle-income countries, particularly of those living in rural 
and hard to reach locations.1-3 One of the main underlying 
factors is the shortage of qualified healthcare providers; 
also their retention in rural and remote health facilities is 
problematic.1,2 This poses a major challenge for equitable 
distribution and delivery of health services. Shortages of 
healthcare providers in rural areas in Bangladesh has a 
profound impact on access to health services to the large 
portion of people residing in rural areas.3,4
Absolute shortage coupled with internal migration of existing 
qualified human resources for health (HRH) to urban areas 
poses an additional challenge against equitable access and use 
of health services,1,2,5 and eventually adoption of universal 
health coverage.6 An adequate number of skilled and motivated 
healthcare providers is closely associated with improved 
health outcomes,7 which the rural population commonly 
lack in many countries including Bangladesh.3 Retention of 
doctors in rural areas has been a global problem,2 more so 
for a developing country like Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, 
there are only 1.1 doctors per 10 000 population in rural 
areas, compared to 18.2 per 10 000 in urban areas.8 The 
trained healthcare providers, particularly medical doctors, 
are mainly concentrated in major cities, whereas unqualified 
or semi-qualified healthcare providers are more skewed to 
the rural areas, serving the majority of the population in the 
country.3,9 For example, 35% of doctors and 30% of the nurses 
are serving 15% of the total population living in four major 
cities of Bangladesh including Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, 
and Khulna, whereas less than 20% of health workers serve 
over 70% people living in rural areas.3 
Further, there has been a wide gap between sanctioned 
positions and filled positions.10 According to the Bangladesh 
Health Facility Survey 2014, 62% of the sanctioned positions 
of doctors are filled at district and sub-district levels; whereas, 
in more rural parts, such as the union level, the percentage 
is below 25%.11 However, the data available from the Health 
Bulletin of Directorate General of Health Services (DGHS), 
2016 shows that the vacancy rates against sanctioned 
positions are improving.12 Of total 127,841 sanctioned 
positions of all healthcare providers, 83% positions are filled-
up and for doctors, the vacancy rate is 6.88% (out of total 
24 028 sanctioned positions). This vacancy rate is likely to be 
significantly higher in rural health facilities compared to the 
urban areas.
Considering the needs for addressing rural retention issue, 
the Government of Bangladesh in recent years has made some 
significant progress in developing and implementing relevant 
policies and strategies. Few of them include Bangladesh Health 
Workforce Strategy 2015,13 Human Resource Management 
(HRM) Operational Plan 2011-2016, Health Nutrition and 
Population Sector Development Program 2011-2016,14 etc. 
However, these policy provisions are not specifically focused 
on promoting and retaining health workers, particularly 
medical doctors in rural health facilities. Further, there 
are policy provisions to improve rural retention, such as 
compulsory rural service for newly recruited medical doctors 
and incentives for rural postings, however, these are not being 
effectively implemented.
In addition to the policy contents mentioned above, to 
understand the implementation failures, it is imperative to 
explore the public policy actors, processes, and contextual 
issues as well.15,16 Although the Bangladeshi health system 
is governed through different directorate generals (most 
notably Directorate Generals of Health Services and Family 
Planning) under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare 
(MoHFW), Bangladesh has a pluralistic health system with 
the coexistence of many stakeholders or agents.8 The health 
sector is served through four major actors: government, 
private sector, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
and donors. The government sector is responsible for both 
policy-making (MoHFW) and service provision (directorate 
generals, such as the DGHS). The government, through 
DGHS, runs 128 secondary and tertiary level hospitals, 
482 upazila and lower level health facilities, and 13 861 
community clinics. The private sector is rapidly expanding 
(currently 78,426 hospital beds in private sector as opposed to 
48 934 under DGHS) and is largely unregulated.12 This sector 
constitutes both formal and informal providers, the former 
targeted towards the rich with high-end services and the 
latter targeted towards the poor with drugstore based retailing 
services. NGOs are mostly involved in primary healthcare 
delivery and donors in technical assistance and financing. 
Despite pluralistic coexistence of different actors and interest 
groups, the public health system is highly centralized in the 
MoHFW, with little delegation (and almost no devolution) of 
power and responsibilities to the local level.17
Recognizing the importance of developing evidence-based 
policies to improve recruitment, deployment and attraction 
of skilled health workers to the remote and rural health 
facilities, World Health Organization (WHO) undertook a 
major review of the evidence in 2010 and issued 16 policy 
guidelines on rural retention, grouped under four broad 
categories of education, regulatory interventions, financial 
incentives, and personal and professional support.2 From 
among these 16 recommendations, we analyzed three selected 
rural retention policies. Since the study was conducted in 
collaboration with the MoHFW, as per the donor’s guideline 
the priority areas for policy analysis was selected by the 
MoHFW partners (Human Resource Management Unit 
of MoHFW; and Center of Medical Education and Health 
and Manpower Development Unit of DGHS) as: (1) career 
development programs (recommendation 3.4.4 in WHO 
guideline, under ‘Personal and professional support’), (2) 
compulsory services in rural areas (recommendation 3.2.3, 
under ‘Regulatory interventions’), and (3) schools outside 
major cities (recommendation 3.1.2, under ‘Education’). This 
paper aimed at analyzing these policy areas in terms of policy 
contents, processes, contexts, and the actors. 
Methods
Research Design
Prior to the selection of key policy aspects, a series of group 
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discussions were held among high officials in MoHFW and 
researchers from BRAC James P Grant School of Public 
Health (JPGSPH), and International Center for Diarrheal 
Disease Research, Bangladesh (icddr,b). Through these 
discussions, the above-mentioned issues were selected 
for policy analysis; on the basis that they had been tried in 
Bangladesh, were relevant to Bangladesh context, and were 
thought to have a potential impact. For analyzing the policies, 
we used qualitative methods, which included document 
reviews; key informant interviews (KIIs) with policy elites, ie, 
“a specific group of decision makers who have high positions 
in an organization, and often privileged access to other top 
members of the same, and other, organizations” (p. 6)18; and 
stakeholder analysis and position-mapping exercise.
Policy Framework
Health policy analysis experts suggest that it is a best-practice 
to base the analysis of policy on an existing framework.16 We 
examined the selected policy areas using the policy triangle 
framework,15 as this is useful for ‘analysis of policy’ (as opposed 
to ‘analysis for policy’)18, ie, understanding an already existing 
policy. We focused on contest, content, actors, process (Figure 
1) relevant to the selected policies:
•	 Under Context, we analyzed, and described the political, 
social, and cultural factors that might have an influence 
on the selected policies.
•	 Under Content, we listed the substance of each selected 
policy. 
•	 Under Actors, first we identified the persons or 
organizations; then assessed their power (authority, 
financial power, ownership of infrastructure, 
membership, expertise, legitimacy, access to media, and 
access to political decision-makers) and position (high 
opposition, medium opposition, low opposition, neutral, 
low support, medium support, and high support) in 
relation to the implementation of specific policies.
•	 Under Process, we discussed the implementation issues 
related to each policy.
Search and Review of Relevant Literature
We conducted a search and review of relevant documents, 
including reports, government documents, conferences and 
workshop proceedings, and media reports, in addition to 
journal articles published since 1971 (year of independence 
of Bangladesh) through May 2013 (year this study was 
commissioned). The details regarding the search and review 
process are described in another published article.19
Key Informant Interviews
We conducted KIIs with policy elites working in HRH and 
related fields in Bangladesh. We identified the potential key 
informants by series of meetings among the research team 
members, which included a senior manager (AU) with 
extensive experience of working in the government health 
sector as well as research institutions in Bangladesh; and 
the Dean (TGE) of JPGSPH at the time of the study, with 
significant experience of working on HRH issues in WHO as 
well as in Bangladesh. Advice was sought from the researchers 
of other projects related to HRH issues at JPGSPH. 
We employed purposive sampling20 strategy, supplemented by 
snowball method; and stopped data collection after attaining 
data saturation. Initially we developed a tentative list of nine 
respondents; but, later, based on the suggestions from them, 
added two more (one from the DGHS and the other from the 
Center for Medical Education). Using a semi-structured KII 
guideline, altogether, 11 KIIs were conducted (Table 1).
The final list of interviewees included policy elites in 
health sector of Bangladesh, academics, researchers, health 
journalists, and bureaucrats from both health and outside 
health sectors. Among the 11 key informants, nine (ie, 
all but the health journalist and the high official from the 
administrative cadre) had a long experience of working as a 
doctor in rural areas of Bangladesh.
The KII guide was drafted by the research team (the first two 
authors and another person, not included in this manuscript). 
The draft was then reviewed by more experienced members 
of the research team (the last two co-authors of this article). 
Incorporating their feedback, the tool was pre-tested on 
a colleague, who has experience of working in rural areas 
of Bangladesh and serving as a health policy and systems 
researcher at present.
The first author conducted most of the interviews, with 
exception of one (with a respondent from DGHS), which 
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Figure 1 Policy triangle framework; source: Walt and Gilson 199415 Figure 1. Policy Triangle Framework; source: Walt and Gilson.15
Table 1. Summary of Key Informants
Type of Key Informant Number
High Officials from MoHFW, including DGHS 3
High official of BM&DC 1
Independent consultant of the World Bank 1
Researchers from academic research institutes such as 
CME, icddr,b, NIPSOM, BIHS, and JPGSPH. One respondent 
belonged to both icddr,b and JPGSPH.
4
Health journalist of a leading Bangladeshi daily newspaper 
Prothom Alo
1
High official from administrative cadre of Bangladesh Civil 
Service
1
Total 11
Abbreviations: DGHS, Directorate General of Health Services; BM&DC, 
Bangladesh Medical and Dental Council; MoHFW, Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare; CME, Center for Medical Education; icddr,b, International 
Center for Diarrheal Disease Research, Bangladesh; NIPSOM, National 
Institute of Preventive and Social Medicine; BIHS, Bangladesh University of 
Health Sciences; JPGSPH, BRAC James P Grant School of Public Health.
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was conducted by the second author. The interviews lasted 
from 45 minutes to one hour and were tape-recorded and 
later translated into English language and were transcribed 
by one of the study team members. Prior to interviews, the 
key informants were fully informed about the objectives of 
the study and the data collection process. Informed written 
consent was obtained prior to all interviews and for tape 
recording of the interviews. This study was approved by 
the Ethical Review Committee of the Bangladesh Medical 
Research Council.
Stakeholder Analysis and Position-Mapping Exercise 
We conducted stakeholder analysis to systematically gather, 
analyze, and understand the voice of the policy actors in 
relation to specific policy areas that we were interested in. 
Those actors were from MoHFW, NGOs, bilateral agencies, 
medical colleges, researchers, academia, independent 
consultants, and health journalists.
Using the steps and the processes recommended by Buse et 
al,18 we also conducted position-mapping exercise among 
these stakeholders. The position-mapping consisted of the 
following steps: (1) identifying the policy actors, (2) assessing 
their political resources or power, and (3) understanding their 
position and interest with respect to the policy areas. This 
map included the list of the stakeholders, organized across 
their positions and color-coded based on their power (Tables 
2, 3, and 4). Different interest groups were categorized into 
different power and positions based on the opinion of the 
participants of the exercise. 
Data Synthesis and Analyses
We compiled and read all transcripts for data familiarization. 
To increase the validity, two authors, one with background 
in health policy and systems research (TJ), and another with 
background in public health (LBR), independently coded 
the dataset and reconciled discrepancies through series of 
meetings. We applied a deductive approach, where a priori 
code-list was developed beforehand, by consulting among the 
research team. Coded texts were categorized into themes, such 
as policy content, policy process, policy context, discussion 
on policy actors, recommendations, and quotations. The 
themes were then organized across three policy areas such as 
(i) schools outside major cities, (ii) compulsory services, and 
(iii) career development program. The information obtained 
from reviews, KIIs and position-mapping exercise were then 
analyzed thematically. Manual color coding technique was 
used for overall data synthesis and analyses. Effort was made 
to triangulate information from all three data sources.
Results 
Policy 1: Career Development Programs
Contents
BCS (health) Recruitment Rule, 1981 does not explicitly 
mention anything about the different tracks under BCS 
(health) cadre; however, by practice the jobs under this cadre 
can be classified roughly into three amorphous and often 
indistinct tracks: (1) General Health Service, (2) Medical 
Teaching, and (3) Health Administration (Figure 2). Another 
relevant policy document is the Gazette Notification on 
Transfer and Posting Policy for Officers in Health Service 
2008, which has a provision of providing training and access 
to higher education; but it does not clearly explain the 
definitive pathway for career development.
Actors
The levels of power of the actors concerning policies for 
career development program (Table 2) are described below:
•	 MoHFW (high power, medium support): primary policy-
making body; generally in favor of career development, 
but cautious about more competition. 
•	 DGHS (high power, medium support): primary 
implementing body; generally in favor of career 
development; but traditionally dominated by doctors 
of Medical Teaching track (mainly from Director up to 
Director General posts).
•	 Bangladesh Medical Association (BMA) (high power, 
medium support): political powerhouse of doctors; 
generally in favor of career development; but more 
concerned about problems of doctors in Medical 
Teaching and General Health Service tracks.
•	 Ministry of Finance (MoF) (high power, medium 
opposition): making any change in the existing career 
ladder requires MoF’s approval; resistant to any change 
requiring additional revenue. 
•	 Bureaucrats from other ministries (medium power, 
high opposition): MoHFW posts are often populated by 
bureaucrats from various other ministries; most of the 
times without any prior experience or expertise in health 
sector.
•	 Individual doctors (low power, low support): primary 
beneficiary of the policy, mainly occupied with clinical 
practice (mostly aspiring for General Health Service 
or Medical Teaching tracks); fearful of losing their 
dominance in higher DGHS positions, should solid 
career tracks be established. Limited power at policy 
level.
Processes
The MoHFW periodically conducts needs assessment based 
on the official vacancy of the doctors against the number of 
available posts. Due to the current insufficient monitoring 
mechanisms, it is difficult for the MoHFW to determine the 
actual number of unauthorized absentee doctors; hence the 
needs assessment for new recruitment often turns out faulty. 
Based on the requisition from the MoHFW, the Ministry of 
Public Administration (MoPA) requests the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) to recruit doctors through Bangladesh 
Civil Service (BCS) examination. The PSC, which is a quasi-
judicial independent commission, recruits doctors along 
with thousands of other employees for the whole public 
sector, through BCS examination. 
According to PSC job circular, only the doctors with a 
Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery (MBBS) degree 
(or equivalent) are recruited as officers in BCS (health) cadre. 
There is no provision for recruiting or leveraging applicants 
with additional trainings in allied health disciplines (eg, public 
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health, health systems management, health administration, 
etc).
According to three key informants and discussants of 
the position-mapping exercise, after the recruitment, the 
existing career development policy is not conducive to rural 
retention as it ensures promotion for only those who has a 
post-graduation. That promotion also comes relatively late 
in Health Administration compared to Medical Teaching 
and General Health Service tracks. This gridlock can only 
be broken by doing a post-graduation, which again requires 
the doctors to stay in urban settings. The post-graduation 
training also paves the way for pursuing the career in either 
Medical Teaching or General Health Service tracks, leaving 
the Health Administration track ignored and deprived. A key 
informant from DGHS said,
“If doctors stay in rural areas for long time, they forget 
everything they learned in medical schools. The need for 
post-graduation encourages the doctors to stay in major 
cities or at least the district level.” 
A fundamental principle of career development programs is 
that anybody entering a cadre service must have the scope to 
climb up to the highest level. But this principle is not adhered 
to in health service cadre. According to the respondent 
from MoHFW, doctors, after being recruited through BCS 
examination of PSC, undergo foundation training with 
other civil servants. Only after serving the government at 
the entry level post (known as Medical Officers or Assistant 
Surgeons) for 4/5 years and obtaining a higher degree, doctors 
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Figure 2 Career trajectory in different tracks under BCS (health) cadre; adapted from Health 
Bulletin 201612 
Actors 
The levels of power of the actors concerning policies for career development program 
(Table 2) are described below: 
Senior Lecturer 
Assistant Professor 
Associate Professor/ 
Vice-Principal of 
Medical Colleges 
Professor/ Principal of 
Medical Colleges 
Junior Lecturer 
Figure 2. Career Trajectory in Different Tracks Under BCS (Health) Cadre; Adapted from Health Bulletin 2016.12
Table 2. Position and Power of Stakeholders in Relation to Policies on Career Development Programs
High Opposition Medium Opposition Low Opposition Neutral Low Support Medium Support High Support
Bureaucrats from other sectors than
health (BCS Administration
Cadre, etc.)
Ministry of Finance Individual doctors MoHFW
DGHS
BMA
Abbreviations: DGHS, Directorate General of Health Services; MoHFW, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; BMA, Bangladesh Medical Association; BCS, 
Bangladesh Civil Service.
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can choose one of the three tracks. The career tracks being 
intensely porous, the migration from one track to another 
at various stages of career is also common. According to the 
respondent from a research organization, who also has a 
long career as doctor under DGHS, track changes are most 
common between Medical Education and General Health 
Services. Highest posts of DGHS are traditionally filled up by 
doctors by lateral migration from either Medical Education 
or General Health Service tracks; usually not by vertical 
promotion within Health Administration track itself.
The supreme policy-making body in Bangladesh health sector 
is the MoHFW, where doctors from any of the health cadre 
tracks are very rarely deployed, as stated by seven respondents 
from DGHS (2), BMDC, independent consultant, and the 
academic institutions (3). According to them, running the 
ministry requires solid administrative skills, management 
knowledge, leadership capabilities; which arguably cannot be 
managed on makeshift basis by untrained professionals. Due 
to the existing recruitment policy described at the beginning 
of this section, MoHFW reportedly never finds adequate staffs 
with required qualifications to run the ministry. The Secretary 
of Health, who is the supreme administrator of MoHFW, is 
almost always borrowed from other BCS cadre services than 
the Health. This person who comes to this vital position 
usually never has experience of working in health sector, nor 
does he have any formal training in public health or health 
systems management. When asked about the effectiveness of 
placing an administrator from a different ministry as the head 
of MoHFW, and whether this is a right thing to do, the key 
informant from MoPA said:
“Administrators under BCS Administration Cadre are 
trained to take on any kind of responsibilities. It is all about 
getting people to do their jobs, which does not require much 
technical know-how’s about that particular field. MoPA is 
often headed by a person formally trained in engineering; 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs has a good number of doctors. 
Then what is the problem if MoHFW is headed by someone 
from other ministries? MoHFW is nothing special!”
On top of career tracks being porous and poorly planned, 
career development or promotion of doctors are often 
influenced by political interferences. The manipulation 
of promotion of the civil servants, and even politicization 
the PSC itself has been criticized and reported both in the 
media and the academic publications.21-23 The promotion 
rules have been altered numerous times in favor of political 
manipulations. In recent past, Bangladesh Civil Service, 
specially the health sector, experienced the bypassing of the 
promotion rules. This caused the doctor political leaders of 
the ruling party to gain undue promotions, particularly in 
the Medical Teaching track. The BMA leaders of ruling party, 
by virtue of their political affiliation, succeeded in gaining 
promotion for a large number of their supporters, who were 
allegedly ineligible for the post. When these news came to 
the media,21 it invoked criticisms and even protests from the 
deprived doctors; and the whole issue ended up in a litigation 
in the high court.
Policy 2: Compulsory Services
Contents
The compulsory service of doctors in rural health facilities 
has been implemented since 1980s. In 2008, the government 
issued a revised gazette notification known as ‘Transfer and 
Posting Policy for Officers in Health Service.’24 According to 
this policy, the newly appointed doctors must serve at least 
two years in rural areas. There are no special provisions for 
newly deployed female doctors, however, in case of a couple 
both of whom are doctors, consideration (not priority!) is 
given for posting them at the same station.
Actors
The levels of power of the actors concerning policies for 
compulsory services (Table 3) are described below:
•	 MoHFW (high power, high support): formally 
highest policy-making body, interested to materialize 
government’s mandates and explicit policies.
•	 DGHS (high power, high support): deploying doctors 
and ensuring their services are primary responsibility.
•	 BMA (high power, medium opposition): enjoys 
membership of almost all Bangladeshi doctors, has 
high political stakes and involvements at state level. 
BMA has shown their power in various occasions in 
the forms of strikes, refraining from providing medical 
care in the hospitals, demonstrations, and even physical 
confrontations. Their power is often claimed to be so 
high as to shake the government itself.25,26
•	 Media (medium power, medium support): Media plays a 
very important and vibrant role in reporting absenteeism. 
•	 Politicians (medium power, low support): demonstrates 
contrasting roles—when approached by local people, 
they stay in favor of compulsory service. Contrarily, 
when approached by the political body of the doctors, 
they keep their mouth shut on this issue.
•	 Health bureaucrats working at district and sub-district 
level (medium power, neutral support): responsible for 
monitoring doctors.
•	 Local government (low power, high support): vocal 
supporter of this policy, but has hardly any power to 
exercise.
Table 3. Position and Power of Stakeholders in Relation to Policies on Compulsory Services
High Opposition Medium Opposition Low Opposition Neutral Low Support Medium Support High Support
BMA
Individual 
doctors
Health bureaucrats working at district 
and sub-district level
Politicians Media MoHFW
DGHS
Local government
Abbreviations: BMA, Bangladesh Medical Association; DGHS, Directorate General of Health Services; MoHFW, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; BCS, 
Bangladesh Civil Service.
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•	 Individual doctors (low power, low opposition): naturally 
are not interested to carry out compulsory rural service; 
but, despite being the primary stakeholder of this policy, 
individually they have little power to exercise.
Processes
The article 25 of the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 
1979 maintains, “No Government servant shall be a member 
of, or be otherwise associated with, any political party or any 
organization affiliated to any political party, or shall take part, 
or assist, in any manner, in any political activity in Bangladesh 
or abroad.”22,27,28 However, many high officials of DGHS are 
affiliated (if not directly involved) with BMA politics. It is 
alleged that, doctors affiliated with the ruling government 
faction of BMA can bypass the compulsory service. Since 
the government puts doctors in the administrative hierarchy 
often based on their political affiliation, these officials are 
also reluctant to go against the interest of BMA to obligate 
the doctor of the same faction to serve compulsorily in rural 
areas. One key informant said:
“Doctors are sent to rural areas by one government 
order; then again withdrawn from those areas by another 
government order. This is a mystery how these government 
orders are made.”
The health bureaucrats working at district and sub-district 
level often relax their monitoring in implementing the 
compulsory services, either due to political alignment or 
vested interests.29 They find themselves in difficult position 
regulating the rules of compulsory deployment because of 
political pressures.
One thing that may potentially change this situation is to 
improve the monitoring mechanism, which was attempted 
by the Management Information System (MIS) division of 
DGHS. They introduced biometric fingerprint attendance 
machines on pilot basis and was planning to scale it up to all 
sub-districts. This initiative, despite being commended by 
various civilian groups, allegedly, started facing challenges 
immediately after implementation. During the pilot phase, 
BMA election came up, and it is alleged by one of our key 
informants that BMA leaders of the ruling party asked the 
relevant bureaucrats not to make too much of it, fearing 
losing of votes.
Apart from political pressures, health bureaucrats working at 
district and sub-district level themselves often turn a blind eye 
on the absentee doctors, as absenteeism is deemed mutually 
beneficial. With their tacit approval, instead of constantly 
staying in rural posts, doctors go to rural health facilities only 
on roster dates. This arrangement leaves many local patients 
for those bureaucrats, who are engaged in private practice in 
addition to public job.
Many of the newly recruited doctors, who the compulsory 
service policy is targeted for, are posted at Union Sub-centers 
(health facilities even below the sub-district level), which lack 
even the basic amenities, infrastructure, housing, security and 
transportation, as reported by the five respondents (the health 
journalist, one DGHS respondent, independent consultant, 
two respondents from the academia). The DGHS respondent 
said,
“There are some limitations in our part. We do not have 
sufficient accommodation to keep them (newly recruited 
doctors) in the rural center.”
While asked why the government might have created the posts 
without facilities, the independent consultant key informant 
reported that, people at different levels of bureaucracy, in 
tandem with some politicians, receive money from the 
applicant doctors, in exchange of an assurance to get them a 
job. He added the comment,
“Every recruitment is a purchase, and every purchase has a 
commission.”
Policy 3: Schools Outside Major Cities
Contents
There are no specific policy documents to obligate either the 
public or private sector to establish medical colleges outside 
the major cities. The Rules for Private Medical and Dental 
Colleges in Bangladesh, 2013 suggests the private sector to 
expand their education services throughout the country, 
without mentioning specifically to establish schools outside 
major cities.
Actors
The levels of power of the actors concerning schools outside 
major cities (Table 4) are described below:
•	 MoHFW (high power, high support): decides 
formally where a public medical college will be 
established.
•	 Politicians (high power, high support): in absence 
of specific policy document, politicians use 
political power to establish medical college in own 
constituency.
•	 Entrepreneurs (medium power, medium support): 
individual entrepreneur, the philanthropic 
foundations, or NGOs decide where to establish a 
private medical college.
•	 DGHS (medium power, neutral support): responsible 
for arrangement of intake exams, deployment of 
teachers; overall implementation of decisions.
•	 Local government/ local people (low power, high 
Table 4. Position and Power Stakeholders in Relation to Policies on Schools Outside Major Cities
High Opposition Medium Opposition Low Opposition Neutral Low Support Medium Support High Support
DGHS
Entrepre neurs (private sector, 
foundations, NGOs)
MoHFW
Politicians
Local government/local people
Abbreviations: DGHS, Directorate General of Health Services; MoHFW, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; NGOs, non-governmental organizations.
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support): has interest and high demand, but has no 
formal way of exercising the power.
Processes
Although according to the guideline for establishing medical 
colleges there should be at least an accompanying 250-bedded 
hospital (or five beds per medical student), the decision often 
does not depend on existence of a suitable hospital, rather 
on political decision. Participants of the position-mapping 
exercise as well as most of the key informants supported this 
statement. The key informant from DGHS said,
“I am telling you very frankly that this (decision to establish a 
public medical college) is totally political. The political leader 
who have power and good command with high profile raise 
the demand to establish a medical college with or without 
any justification.”
One of the key informants informed that the medical colleges 
were established in the constituencies of the influential 
Members of Parliament of the ruling parties. One respondent 
(the independent consultant) categorically mentioned,
“That’s why you see a medical college in District X [ie, the 
District the Head of Government at the time of the study was 
hailing from].”
This, however, does not hold for private medical colleges. 
It is the entrepreneurs’ choice where they want to establish 
private medical colleges; and they do it where profits can be 
maximized.
A summary of the policy analysis is provided in Table 5.
Discussion 
The analysis of three policies related to rural retention of 
doctors revealed four cross-cutting themes: lack of proper 
systems or policies in some areas, vested interest or corruption 
of stakeholders aggravating the situation, undue and all 
pervasive political influence, and configuration and power of 
those in places of importance for policy-making. These are 
discussed below with implications for the ‘rural retention’ 
problem in Bangladesh. 
Absence of Proper System or Policy
In policy area 1, ie, career development programs, we 
found, despite the existence of policy provision for career 
path development, principles for promotion and transfer, 
and provision of post-graduation and in-service training 
to the medical doctors, these policy provisions are neither 
well defined nor well implemented when it comes to career 
development of doctors, particularly for those working in 
the rural areas. This has also been observed in earlier studies 
from Bangladesh.25,30 No leverage was given to applicants 
with relevant qualifications (eg, public health, health systems 
management, health administration) during recruitment in 
BCS (health). Promotions were late in Health Administration 
track and largely contingent on clinical post-graduation, 
which reduced the duration of rural stay. These findings are 
also supported by Darkwa et al.30
In policy area 2, ie, compulsory services, we found females 
were not given the priority to work in the same location as 
their male doctor partners. In Bangladesh context, many of 
the female doctors’ partners were from the same profession 
and residing in rural areas without their male partners was 
often socially unacceptable.9,31 Similar pattern was observed 
in Pakistan, which shares fair social, cultural, religious, and 
historical similarity with Bangladesh.32,33
In policy area 3, ie, school outside major cities, we found there 
was no explicit policy document to encourage or enforce 
establishment of medical colleges in rural areas. Absence of 
proper health systems support and policy promoting rural 
retention has also been reported in several other countries.9,30,32
Vested Interest or Corruption
In policy area 1, we found personnel from other ministries 
get lateral entry in occupying high MoHFW posts. DGHS 
posts were also filled up by doctors from tracks other than 
the Health Administration track. This tendency is arguably 
neither new nor special to Bangladesh.25,34
In policy area 2, we found field level health bureaucrats 
facilitated doctors’ departure from duty station (by allowing 
roster based non-continuous duty) in the interest of their 
own private practice. This type of tolerance towards partial or 
total absenteeism in public sector is observed in some African 
countries as well.35 The findings also show that some higher-
level bureaucrats and politicians created posts for doctors 
without accounting for required infrastructure and facilities; 
allegedly to graft money from applicants in exchange of 
ensuring those jobs. The importance of proper infrastructure 
and facilities in favor of rural retention has been widely 
reported in literature,9 and the issue of bribery in exchange 
of job offers in health sector has been widely reported in 
Bangladeshi media.36
In policy area 3, we found private entrepreneurs established 
medical colleges based on financial motives, rather than 
consideration for rural retention. The profit motive of private 
higher educational institutions is well documented,37,38 and 
understandable.
Political Interference
In policy area 1, we found recent changes in promotion system 
to facilitate political interference. We also found evidence of 
undue promotions motivated by political affiliations, leading 
even to litigation. Shah et al also showed, in Pakistan, politically 
powerful persons frequently interfered with appointment and 
transfer of health sector staff.32 Similar pattern was observed 
in Sierra Leone, where job postings are reportedly altered due 
to political interference and deserving candidates are often 
deprived of promotions due to political motives.39
In policy area 2, the participants shared that members or the 
activists of ruling party faction of BMA generally bypass the 
provision of ‘compulsory’ rural services. Darkwa et al also 
showed, in Bangladesh, absentee doctors maintained good 
relations with higher authorities and politicians, and obtained 
unfair recommendations from them to avoid compulsory 
rural services.30 Similar ‘political trade-unionism’ was 
observed before, when policy attempts were made to restrict 
doctors’ private practice and introduce local government-led 
monitoring mechanism of the health centers.25
In policy area 3, we found politics or the politicians, not the 
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Table 5. Summary of Policy Analysis
Contents Actors Processes Policy Recommendations
Policy 1: Career 
development program
BCS (health) Recruitment Rule, 1981
Indistinct tracks: 1. General Health 
Service, 2. Medical Teaching, 3. 
Health Administration
Gazette Notification on Transfer and 
Posting Policy for Officers in Health 
Service 2008
MoHFW (high power, medium support) 
DGHS (high power, medium support)
BMA (high power, medium support)
Ministry of Finance (high power, medium 
opposition)
Bureaucrats from other departments 
(medium power, high opposition)
Individual doctors (low power, low support)
Porous tracks
Not leveraging applicants with required skills
Late promotions
Promotion contingent on post-graduation in 
clinical field only
People from other ministries occupying high 
MoHFW posts
Higher DGHS posts filled up by lateral 
migration from other tracks
Change of promotion system to facilitate 
political interference
Undue promotion to political allies
Applicants with expertise and experience in public health, health systems, 
health administration, etc should be given leverage, or recognition in BCS 
(health) recruitment
Recruitment should be quick, customized, and transparent, without scope 
for graft and political influence or motive
Tracks within the health service (General Health Service, Medical Teaching, 
and Health Administration) must be clearly defined, distinct, and respected
New recruits should be assigned to one track from the beginning
Lateral entry from other tracks should be restricted
Promotion within each track should be timely, smooth, fair, and free from 
corruption and political interference
Higher education should be encouraged and rewarded, but not at the cost 
of rural postings
Policy 2: Compulsory 
services
Compulsory service in rural areas for 
2 years, in law since 1980s
Transfer and Posting Policy for 
Officers in Health Service, 2008
Not conducive for couple doctors
MoHFW (high power, high support)
DGHS (high power, high support)
BMA (high power, medium opposition)
Media (medium power, medium support)
Politicians (medium power, low support)
Health bureaucrats working at district and 
sub-district level (medium power, neutral 
support)
Local government (low power, high 
support)
Individual doctors (low power, low 
opposition)
No priority for females to be posted in the 
same location as their spouse
Health bureaucrats working at district and 
sub-district level allowing doctors’ roster duty
Creating posts without facilities to take money 
against recruitments
Bending the rule due to political affiliation
Amenities, equipment, infrastructure, security, and other facilities should 
be ensured prior to posting
These should accommodate current trend of feminization of medical 
profession
Female employees should be prioritized to stay with their spouse
Strict monitoring of staff, using modern technology
Scrutinize field bureaucrats
Non-practising allowance for field bureaucrats
Bypassing of compulsory services based on political alliance must be 
stopped
Separation of politics from bureaucracy must be encouraged 
Existing rule prohibiting public servants from getting engaged in politics 
must be enforced
Policy 3: Schools 
outside major cities
No specific policy
Rules for Private Medical and Dental 
Colleges in Bangladesh, 2013: 
private sector to expand education 
throughout country
MoHFW (high power, high support)
Politicians (high power, high support)
Entrepreneurs (medium power, medium 
support)
DGHS (medium power, neutral support)
Local government/local people (low power, 
high support)
Absence of a policy to establish schools 
outside cities
Private entrepreneurs establishing medical 
schools on profitability, not rural retention 
considerations
Establishing medical colleges using political 
influence
Specific policy guideline should be prepared
This should have specific directions for both public and private sector 
Population need, rather than profit or political motive must get priority in 
deciding the site
Rural students should get priority in admission
Abbreviations: DGHS, Directorate General of Health Services; MoHFW, Ministry of Health and Family Welfare; BMA, Bangladesh Medical Association; BCS, Bangladesh Civil Service.
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policy guidelines, determined where a medical college would 
be established. Overall, political factors have been found to 
be demotivating for doctors to stay in rural areas.9,32 Political 
scientists Jahan and Shahan, drawing examples from different 
sectors of Bangladesh, argued that the power of politics is 
something we cannot just ignore.23
Position and Power of Actors of Interest
In policy area 1, we found high opposition of bureaucrats 
against career development of doctors. This was 
understandable, because, proper career development within 
MoHFW (ie, from field level up to the top) would mean their 
opportunities of posting at the top positions in a ministry 
would be compromised. Individual doctors were not much 
supportive too, as rural posting meant decreased quality of 
life and career opportunities.
In policy area 2, the findings suggested that, in most cases 
the BMA showed medium opposition to compulsory 
services, as many of their members would not want to go 
to rural areas. Dussault and Franceschini also showed how 
strategies to deal with geographical distribution of HRH 
faced negative outcomes due to resistance from professional 
groups of doctors in other countries.9 Health bureaucrats 
working at district and sub-district level remained neutral, 
torn between their professional responsibility and political 
alignment. Interestingly, local politicians also showed low 
support, as opposed to the expectation that they would be 
highly supportive due to the demand of the people of their 
constituency. Local government had a high support for the 
policy, but they held low power in implementing the policy.
In policy area 3, we found high support and power of MoHFW 
and politicians for establishing schools outside major cities, 
which was encouraging. But private entrepreneurs had 
medium support, as their support often depended on profit 
motive. Local government/local people enjoyed low power in 
this regard, despite their high support for the policy.
Policy Recommendations
Roberts, Hsiao, Berman, and Reich suggest that position, 
power, players, and perceptions of the policy stakeholders have 
important bearing on policy implementation.40 Strategies, 
if designed based on the understanding of the position and 
power of actors of interest, can impart a positive influence on 
the rural retention of doctors.18 Considering these factors, and 
drawing on our findings from the policy analysis, we propose 
the following policy recommendations:
In policy area 1, to ensure a smooth career development, 
first, the recruitment policy needs to be updated considering 
the changes and the current needs of the Bangladesh health 
systems. Doctors with expertise and experience in public 
health, health systems, health administration, etc. should be 
given leverage, or at least recognition. Recruitment should be 
quick, customized, and transparent, without scope for graft 
and political influence or motive. Secondly, the tracks within 
the health service (General Health Service, Medical Teaching, 
and Health Administration) must be clearly defined, distinct, 
and maintained. New recruits should be assigned from the 
very beginning to one of these tracks, with possibility of track 
changes only on special circumstances. Lateral entry from 
other tracks, especially in high ranks should be restricted. This 
principle should apply to MoHFW positions, up to the highest 
level. Thirdly, promotion within each track should be timely, 
fair, and free from corruption and political interference. It 
has been found that measures such as organizational support 
like timely promotion has a positive association with staff 
satisfaction (Pearson correlation coefficient 0.37) while it 
has a negative association (-0.42) with turnover intention of 
Bangladeshi public-sector doctors,41 eventually impacting 
on rural retention. Finally, higher education should be 
encouraged and rewarded, but not at the cost of rural postings.
In policy area 2, to ensure compulsory services, first, the 
security, amenities, equipment, infrastructure, and other 
facilities should be ensured prior to posting. These should be 
in keeping with the current trend of feminization of medical 
profession in Bangladesh. Accounting for the socio-cultural 
reality of Bangladesh, female employees should be prioritized 
to stay with their spouse, if applicable. Secondly, once posted, 
they should be strictly monitored; modern technology (eg, 
biometric finger print, online sign-in and random central 
monitoring, etc) may be employed in this regard along 
with bringing under strict control of the health bureaucrats 
working at district and sub-district level with clearly defined 
roles and responsibilities for them. Non-practising allowance 
may be considered to engage them for better management. 
Thirdly, bypassing of compulsory services based on political 
alliance must be stopped. For this to implement, separation 
of politics from bureaucracy is encouraged. Existing rules 
prohibiting public servants from getting engaged in politics 
must be enforced.
In policy area 3, to establish medical schools outside major 
cities, first, specific policy guidelines on establishing medical 
colleges should be prepared with clear directions for both 
public and private sectors. Actual population need, rather 
than profit motive or political ‘sweet will,’ must get priority for 
establishing medical colleges. The rural students in real term 
should get priority in getting admission in these institutions.
Strengths and Limitations
The research was greatly benefitted by the team combination 
of both ‘insiders’ (from Bangladesh - TJ, AU, SMA) and 
‘outsiders’ (not from Bangladesh - LBR, TGE), a combination 
that reportedly yields “the richest and most comprehensive 
understanding of the policy process.”16 However, the focus of 
the study was limited to the doctors working in the formal 
health sector of Bangladesh, and also higher number of 
respondents from a more diverse background including 
those working at the district/sub-district level could not be 
interviewed due to time and resource constraints. Private-
sector doctors, despite their increasing dominance in health 
service provision, were not included in this analysis. This was 
because we tried to focus the policy analysis in alignment with 
the priority concern of the MoHFW, which was ‘absenteeism’ 
of public-sector doctors in public health facilities in the rural 
areas.
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Conclusion
The crisis of retaining doctors at their places of rural postings 
often stemmed from weaknesses of the health systems and 
its policy environment. Often the effectiveness of existing 
policies was compromised by failures in implementation 
due to political interference and corruption. Our position-
mapping exercise revealed that, some policy makers in high 
positions (eg, bureaucrats from other ministries than health, 
BMA) opposed some of the rural retention policies, whereas 
those who supported (eg, local people, local government) 
were not sufficiently empowered. Ultimately, commitment 
from the highest level of political hierarchy is the key to the 
successful implementation of the rural retention policies of 
the government. 
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